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the analytical work based on firm-level survey data should help to promote
evidence-based dialogue among stakeholders.
Finally, the World Bank has also mounted proactive initiatives aimed at
addressing problems of market imperfections, including the bank’s support
of supply-chain-based marketing and production systems reforms. Assess-
ing the potential of the bank’s supply-chain projects, Ronald Kopicki notes
that “depending on the product commodity and target market, bottom-up
chains may have as their precise mission a number of different operational
strategies. They may target, for example, the reduction of economic rents
and the number of mediation levels that separate farmers from retail con-
sumers. When rents or marketing margins decline, corresponding improve-
ments occur in the net prices available at the farm gate.”3 To the extent that
such projects become mainstreamed in the bank’s operational and capacity-
building work, progress in addressing problems of imperfect market struc-
tures is possible.
Stephen O’Connell: Mozambique’s export liberalization thus far has disap-
pointed the hopes of at least some of its proponents. Among cashew farm-
ers, the supply response has been weaker and the distributional impact less
decisive than the World Bank had hoped. On the processing side, while the
bank must have been prepared ex ante for the possible demise of the cashew
processing industry, the rapidity of that demise was probably unexpected
and has provided a focal point for groups opposed to the liberalization.
I enjoyed this paper very much. In characteristic fashion, the authors
bring clarity and insight to the debate while shifting it in novel directions. I
will focus on three claims that, in my view, constitute the paper’s main con-
tributions:
—credibility is important in understanding persistently weak supply
response in Mozambique;
—standard arguments for liberalization pay insufficient attention to the
implications of buyer-side market power;
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3. Supply chains are forms of industrial-agricultural organizations that encompass multi-
ple value-adding functions, typically including sourcing inputs, producing, and delivering
products to customers. Supply chains operate in lieu of arms-length transactions to facilitate
the transfer of products, information, ownership rights, and cash or credit between farms or
firms and their ultimate customers. The ultimate aim of supply chains is to reduce risk and
transaction costs for participants. See Kopicki (2003). 
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—and patterns of imperfect competition in world cashew markets favor a
policy geared toward the export of processed rather than raw cashews.
Credibility and supply response. The analysis of credibility and supply
response draws on Margaret McMillan’s doctoral thesis, which provides an
insightful account of pre-reform patterns of commodity export taxation in
Africa. But reform has now held for a decade, export taxation is in wide dis-
repute, and Mozambique’s government is nowhere near the fiscal straits
associated with the predatory African regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. The
last observation is mainly due to very high levels of foreign aid, but the gov-
ernment also introduced a value-added tax in 1999, thereby reducing the
pressure on other tax handles. If there is a residual credibility issue, there-
fore, it would have to be associated not with fiscal predation but with the
possibility of a major revision of government policy toward the processing
industry or a precipitous decline in aid. Neither event seems likely, unless of
course the government of Mozambique takes this paper really seriously, in
which case we may have both an increase in the export tax rate and a
decline in aid. Though I am kidding here, I do wonder about the traction of
the credibility argument, not only in Mozambique but also in other African
countries where it initially seemed very appealing. Ghana is a good exam-
ple. Poor credibility was a very appealing explanation for low private
investment in the 1980s, but after twenty years of sustained, market-based
reform and political liberalization it is hard to believe that fears of reversion
to an expropriation equilibrium play much of a role.
In the case of Mozambique, care should be taken not to discard alterna-
tive explanations for slow growth in cashew production. It may be that a
merely liberal trade policy (that is, one that stops short of actually subsidiz-
ing cashew production), or merely a liberal trade policy (that is, one that
stops short of complementary interventions in other policy areas) is not
enough—even under certainty about the export tax rate—to offset poor
prospects for world cashew prices, a strong real exchange rate, or nonprice
barriers to new planting. In some other cases of tree crop sector regenera-
tion, it has taken very determined government support and intervention to
stimulate a major renewal of the capital stock, a good example being rubber
in Indonesia. It would be a mistake, I think, to view these interventions as
designed essentially to firm up commitments about producer prices. In fact
the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) have been oversold on policies
designed to make policy reversals economically costly. The key, instead, is
to make reneging politically costly. This is harder to do, particularly when
156 Brookings Trade Forum: 2003
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failure can be blamed on the BWIs themselves. Therefore I am much more
comfortable when the authors turn from the dangers of low credibility to
those of weak ownership. Major price reforms are likely to fail, it seems to
me, unless they emerge from a medium-term vision that the home govern-
ment can embrace and articulate publicly, and that includes complementary
interventions that directly support the private sector’s supply response.
What is clear from this paper is that the Mozambican government does not
yet possess such a vision.
I do think the discussion of supply response would benefit from a bit
more attention to the macroeconomic context. Mozambique received a
tremendous postconflict aid boom starting around 1994, followed in fairly
short order by a substantial boom in foreign direct investment. These pro-
duced a sharp real appreciation in the mid-1990s, at least partially offsetting
the influence of lower export tax rates. Aid may have had a pro-export bias
in other respects, for example in helping to secure the countryside and
restore rural transport infrastructure. But the Bank of Mozambique, like
other African central banks on nominally floating exchange rates, at various
points since the early 1990s has expressed considerable concern about the
influence of real appreciation on traditional exports. And as aid flows have
declined, their social spending component, which is heavily nontraded,
probably has increased. A persistently strong equilibrium real exchange rate
is not very good for export promotion. Some further discussion of the
macroeconomic context, therefore, would be useful in putting into perspec-
tive the authors’ partial equilibrium calculation and their before-versus-after
graphs of cashew production and exports. Production and export trends
reflect all of the important forces operating on the sector, not just trade pol-
icy per se. It may be that export response was stronger than it appears, rela-
tive to the relevant counterfactual.
Confronting the marketing margin. The paper reminds one forcefully and
elegantly that export taxes form only a part of the wedge between FOB
prices and farmgate prices. The remainder accrues to the various stages of
the domestic purchasing chain, in the form of a marketing margin m:
P = (1 – m)(1 – t)EP*,
where t is the export tax, E is the exchange rate, and P* is the world price.
What this means is that while cashews are internationally traded, smallhold-
ers are effectively quite distant from international markets. A lot of insight
flows from this observation, and I think this structure might be used even
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more systematically to organize the discussion of policy reform. As the
authors point out, for example, even without buyer-side market power and
with full pass-through of the export tax wedge to farmgate prices (that is,
with a fixed m), a dollar of export tax relief goes mainly to the marketing
chain and not to cashew farmers. By the same token, policies that work
directly on m, for example by lowering transport and marketing costs, may
target smallholder incomes much more effectively than export tax relief. So
may policies that encourage the vertical integration of smallholders into
cashew marketing,
When there is substantial buyer-side market power, smallholders are
even further from world markets, and on top of this the level of cashew pro-
duction is inefficiently low. I am somewhat uncomfortable with the authors’
assumption that the number of active buyers in a market determines rents.
After all, even with few buyers in each local market, the market may be
contestable—or perhaps could be made more so, for example by publishing
information on local prices. But the depredations of the middleman have
been an important theme in African history. One of the important contribu-
tions of this paper is to make the case for more microeconomic evidence on
this issue.
If market power is indeed important, then competition policy becomes a
legitimate focus of agricultural policy. What interventions are appropriate
when buyer-side market power produces double or triple marginalization
and a cascade of rents? A tempting answer is to set minimum prices at each
stage. Any increase in the minimum price at each stage toward the competi-
tive equilibrium reduces the buyer’s rent, shifting surplus to the seller while
also enhancing efficiency. This approach looks a lot like the marketing
board and price control mechanisms that became prevalent in Africa after
World War II, often in response to lobbying by the interested groups (that is,
the kind of grassroots collective action donors are trying so hard to restore).
These arrangements fell into disrepute when they became instruments of
fiscal predation, that is, when governments used them to enforce price max-
ima, not price minima. The analysis in this paper suggests that their removal
was at best a compromise with reality, justified not by the unalloyed attrac-
tions of laissez-faire, but by a judgment that governments were not capable
of handling a potentially important instrument of competition policy and
poverty targeting.
From this perspective one can readily see the huge attraction of public
investment in transport networks, which may economize more directly on
158 Brookings Trade Forum: 2003
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the government’s limited institutional capability. A better rural road network
should improve smallholder incomes and incentives both directly (by low-
ering transport costs) and indirectly (by enhancing competition at the local
and possibly wholesale level of the marketing chain). This is surely close to
the World Bank’s view. The problem is, again, that I do not think there is
much microeconomic evidence on how strong the procompetitive effects of
transport investment are, and over what horizon.
I also suspect that in pushing the liberalization of agricultural marketing,
the World Bank made relatively few distinctions between situations in
which competition was already flourishing in parallel markets and situations
in which parallel channels were not well developed. This matters, because
in the latter case there is perhaps some presumption for the country and crop
in question that entry barriers are high and, therefore, that portions of the
marketing chain may have substantial market power if the market is deregu-
lated. Market liberalization may then create new, private rents in the market-
ing chain, thereby undermining to some degree the incentive effect of
export tax reductions. If parallel channels are already active, then market
power concerns are less immediately plausible, but one then has to worry
about whether the export tax rate has much influence at all on the relevant
supply price at the farmgate (and for that matter whether the data are meas-
uring total output or just the legally marketed portion).
Protecting the cashew processing industry. This paper is admirably even-
handed. But given the stakes in the globalization debate, I wish the authors
would tip their hands a bit more. The problem is that everyone is fallible,
which implies that one can identify weaknesses in any reform effort. The
real question is whether the case for reforms remains intact, given a few
important corrections here and there. Or, should Mozambique be subsidiz-
ing cashew processing, as do Brazil, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia? And if
Mozambique should be subsidizing the processing stage, should it do so, at
least in part, by heavily taxing exports of raw cashews?
The authors bring a novel dimension to the argument by focusing on
market structure. They observe that the world processed cashew market is
competitive, while the raw cashew market is occupied by a monopsonist.
Given this configuration, they argue, Mozambique enjoys a terms of trade
gain on each cashew that it processes itself rather than selling in the world
market. It seems to me, however, that Mozambique should process its own
cashews only if one of two conditions holds. Either processing must be
profitable at world prices (which include the monopsony discount on raw
Margaret McMillan, Karen Horn Welch, and Dani Rodrik 159
03 isbn0-8157-1287-1 BTF2003 McMillan.qxd  2/4/2004  3:12 PM  Page 159
cashews, kindly provided by India’s self-restraint as a major buyer) and
appropriate shadow prices of domestic resources, or the externalities to pro-
cessing must be sufficient to justify protection. In fact under either of these
conditions, Mozambique should process other countries’ cashews too. Now,
is intervention required to support cashew processing under these condi-
tions? In the absence of distortions or externalities, if processing is prof-
itable at world prices it should be profitable at domestic prices and protec-
tion should be unnecessary. If there are externalities, then intervention is
potentially justified, but in the absence of administrative or political econ-
omy arguments, it should take the form of subsidies to cashew processing,
not an export tax.
Where does this leave us? Actual experience tells us that the cashew
industry cannot make money at domestic prices, at least not in the absence
of a substantially higher tax on raw cashews than is currently in place. To
say this another way, unless domestic distortions are the culprit, Mozam-
bique does not appear to have comparative advantage in cashew processing.
This is not necessarily surprising. As Adrian Wood has emphasized, pro-
cessing, in some cases, is significantly more intensive in human and physi-
cal capital than primary production, a pattern that sits uneasily with Mozam-
bique’s relatively rich endowment of land and raw labor. The only way out
of this conclusion, without appealing to externalities, leads to the labor mar-
ket. Maybe labor is available to the processing industry only at a wage that
is well above the social opportunity cost of labor. But then a wage subsidy
or other labor market intervention seems the right approach, not a cashew
export tax.
One therefore ends up having to rest the argument for intervention on a
claim that there are substantial domestic externalities to cashew processing.
What are these externalities? Again, the evidence is very limited. Even with
the clarity contributed by this paper, one may simply need to take a stand on
whether the Indonesia model or the World Bank model is the right one for
Mozambique.
With respect to the authors’ cost-benefit calculation, I am not fully com-
fortable with the inclusion of large gains from employment. Certainly one
of the costs of a noncredible reform is to leave labor temporarily idle, as
laid-off workers wait around for the policy reversal that will reemploy them.
The employment gains from not reducing the cashew export tax may there-
fore be temporarily large. But if one wants a welfare analysis of alternative
trade policies, which I think is the real issue, the temporary costs of non-
160 Brookings Trade Forum: 2003
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credibility should be downplayed relative to the permanent costs and bene-
fits of alternative regimes. To assess the latter, one needs a medium-term,
general-equilibrium treatment of the opportunity cost of labor used in the
processing industry (and, for that matter, the capital as well). As suggested
above, if a substantial wage gap remains from this perspective, it may be
driven by a labor market distortion like an urban minimum wage that should
be carefully scrutinized before being compounded into trade policy choices.
In sum, export promotion has proven a slower and harder task in most of
Africa than many expected, starting in the early 1980s when it seemed so
clear that reforming hugely distortionary trade and marketing regimes
would unleash a strong supply response and generate a highly progressive
distributional impact. The Mozambican case provides a rich illustration of
themes the authors have emphasized in other work on trade reform, includ-
ing the dominance of income transfers over efficiency gains and importance
of credibility. It also demonstrates the potentially powerful influence of the
long marketing chains that characterize many of Africa’s commodity
exports. The paper makes a convincing case for sustained further work on
the nature of these chains and many ways in which government policies
may affect the nature of competition and size of the marketing margin.
Everyone is aware, at some level, that the poorest are rarely those with mar-
ket access or market power. The challenge is to take this observation seri-
ously, as this important paper does.
Discussion: There was an active discussion of this paper. Marc Melitz
argued that the issues of policy credibility and sustainability warranted more
attention than they had received in the paper, and he expressed the view that
they were likely to have been important determinants of the outcome. Dani
Rodrik agreed. Domestic cashew processors held demonstrations and
actively pressured the Mozambican government, so that whether the policy
would be maintained was certainly in question.
In Melitz’s view, the discussion of monopsony in India was surprisingly
detailed. Building on Stephen O’Connell’s remarks, he identified three
interrelated questions around which he would have focused. First, would the
cashew farmers prefer to export rather than sell domestically? From the
analysis presented, it seemed to him that the answer was yes, despite the
lower export prices that may have resulted from Indian monopsony. The
second question, then, was whether Mozambique should process cashews
domestically. If the answer to this question is also yes, perhaps because of
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some types of externalities, then one should ask how best to achieve this
goal. In this context, he would have liked more discussion of the pros and
cons of export quotas, taxes, and other policy alternatives.
Penny Goldberg found it difficult to evaluate the effects of trade reform
without a fuller discussion of the counterfactuals. For example, if the pro-
cessing industry would have collapsed in any case, a trade reform that redi-
rected sellers away from domestic purchasers to exports was presumably
desirable. She also found it odd for the processing industry to blame its
demise on farmers if, in fact, farmgate prices did not increase much during
the relevant period.
In a similar vein, Cathy Pattillo noted that it would be useful to take the
macroeconomic context into account more explicitly. She suggested that a
discussion of how the industry might have fared under alternative macro-
economic scenarios would make the trade policy analysis more convincing.
Gianni Zanini found the case study of Mozambique’s experience very
interesting but cautioned against drawing general policy conclusions from a
single example. While not based on formal analysis, his own knowledge of
the effects of liberalization of hides and skins, frankincense, and myrrh in
Somalia suggested very different outcomes: liberalization had tended to
result in reduced price margins. Zanini was puzzled by the claim in this
paper that the marketing margins for cashews in Mozambique had more
than doubled from $117 before liberalization to $262 afterward, especially
because the main change appeared to have been for cashews to be sold to
traders, who would then sell to wholesalers and exporters instead of to
domestic processing plants, which he would interpret as in increase in com-
petition.
Thomas Palley commended the authors on their interesting analysis,
which he believed highlights the importance of South-South concerns in the
debate about globalization. The implications of liberalization in Mozam-
bique were influenced by potential monopsony in India, as well as produc-
tion subsidies in Brazil and Vietnam. These factors warrant more attention
than they often receive. Palley also saw lessons for both sides of the global-
ization debate. For proglobalizers, the case study spotlights the need to
involve stakeholders, while for antiglobalizers it flags the importance of
incentives. Finally, he was curious about the production situation in 1973
and how important this history may have been relative to more recent politi-
cal and other pressures in explaining the subsequent production decline.
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